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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2852
________________

TYRONE P. JAMES,
Appellant
v.
YORK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; JAMES H. MORGAN,
Agent/Investigator; DETECTIVE RICHARD PEDDICORD;
RAYMOND E. CRAUL, Detective; SERGEANT GENE FELLS;
DETECTIVE KESSLER, York County Drug Task Force;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BAYLARK, York County Prison;
RANDY SNIPES; BRIAN WESTMORLAND; DETECTIVE GLOWCZESKI
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-01015)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
_______________________________________

Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 10, 2005
Before: ROTH, FUENTES AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: December 8, 2005 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
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PER CURIAM

Tyrone James sued the York County Police Department and police and
correctional officers for alleged constitutional violations arising from his treatment
during his January 2001 arrest, detention, interrogation, and prosecution for state drug
charges. Specifically, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he claimed violations of the Fourth
Amendment (for an illegal search and seizure, and the use of excessive force during his
arrest), the Fifth Amendment (for compelled self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and
violations of his right to counsel), the Sixth Amendment (for violations of his right to
counsel), the Eighth Amendment (for the use of excessive force and the setting of an
excessive bond), and the Fourteenth Amendment (for the use of excessive force).
Because the allegations on which James based his claims are familiar to the
parties, we will recount them only briefly. A California employee of a mailbox rental
company reported a suspicious package to a California narcotics officer. After finding
drugs in the package, the narcotics officer called the Pennsylvania authorities to set up a
sting. Police in Pennsylvania constructed a dummy package and placed it in the
Pennsylvania mailbox rental facility where James leased a mailbox. When James
claimed the package, two undercover police officers approached him. James dropped the
box and began to move away from the officers. The side of a slow-moving van, driven
by another officer, hit him. Other officers surrounded him, stepped on him, and
handcuffed him. The police arrested James, but they did not read him his Miranda rights
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before interrogating him. Police and correctional officers refused his requests to call his
family members and his lawyer. While James was being interrogated, police officers
harassed his wife. Three officers took James to his bail hearing, where his bond was set
at $2.5 million dollars, payable in cash only. Those three officers harassed James’ wife
and her sister at the bail hearing.
After screening James’ case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, in an order dated
September 18, 2001, the District Court dismissed the harassment claims that James
brought on behalf of his wife and her sister, as well as the claims James filed in order to
end or alter his state prosecution and confinement. On the motion of some Defendants,
the District Court, in its order of October 8, 2003, dismissed James’ Sixth Amendment
claim of denial of counsel, and his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of
excessive force, for failure to state a claim. On November 12, 2003, upon review of a
motion for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed James’ claims against
Correctional Officer Baylark, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The District
Court dismissed the suit against Randy Sipes1 for lack of personal jurisdiction on Sipes’
motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under § 1915A, the District Court again evaluated the claims against the
York County Police Department, and dismissed them for failure to state a claim in its
order of May 6, 2005. In that order, the District Court also granted summary judgment in

1

We substitute the correct spelling for Defendants’ names where necessary.
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favor of the remaining Defendants on the remaining claims. Over the course of the case,
the District Court also denied James’ motions for appointment of counsel and his
discovery motions. James appeals and moves for appointment of counsel.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The first issue is the scope of
our review. James identified two District Court orders in his notice of appeal, the final
judgment entered on May 6, 2005, and an order of February 20, 2002,2 in which the
District Court denied two of James’ motions for appointment of counsel and denied one
of James’ discovery motions without prejudice to refiling after the District Court ruled on
a then-pending motion to dismiss. Although Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires an appellant to designate the “judgment, order, or part thereof
appealed from,” an appeal from a final judgment will implicate all non-final orders and
rulings which produced the judgment. See Polanski v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137
F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998). For that reason, we will review all the District Court
orders described above, insomuch as they dismiss James’ claims, not just the two District
Court orders that James listed in his notice of appeal.
James also specifically appeals from “the Order dated May 4, 2004,” in which a
Magistrate Judge denied some of James’ discovery motions. Because a Magistrate Judge
issued the order of May 4, 2004, under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), James

2

The order that James identifies as the February 20, 2000 order is the order stamped as
filed on February 20, 2002, but listed on the District Court docket as filed on February 25,
2002. It is the order entered on February 26, 2002.
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was obligated to preserve his objections to that order by timely objecting to it in the
District Court. See United Steelworkers of America v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d
1001, 1007-08 (3d Cir. 1987). James only objected to a portion of that order, insomuch
as it granted Defendants’ motion to depose him and denied him a protective order from
the proposed deposition pending the resolution of one of his motions for appointment of
counsel. Therefore, we will review the aspect of the Magistrate Judge’s order that the
District Court considered.
After considering the relevant District Court orders, we will affirm because no
substantial question is presented on appeal. See L.A.R. 27.4. Our review of the District

Court’s orders dismissing James’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary. See
Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.
1996). We likewise exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment. See Abramson v. William Paterson College, 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).
We review de novo the District Court’s order dismissing claims against one Defendant
for lack of personal jurisdiction, although we review any related factual findings for clear
error. Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002); Pennzoil Prods.
Co. v. Colleli & Assocs., 149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998). Our review of the pertinent
discovery orders is for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d
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580, 605 (3d Cir. 2004). Similarly, we review the orders denying the motions for
appointment of counsel to evaluate whether the District Court clearly abused its
discretion. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).
First, the District Court properly dismissed, on screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, the claims that James wished to bring on behalf of his wife and her sister.

Ordinarily, a person does not have standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of a
third party. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). Although exceptions to
this rule exist, see Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976), none applies in
James’ case. Therefore, James could not bring claims of police harassment on behalf of
his wife or her sister. The District Court also did not err in dismissing, on screening, the
portions of the complaint in which James sought to end or alter his state prosecution and
confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
In its order of October 8, 2003, the District Court properly dismissed some of
James’ claims. Specifically, to the extent that James brought his excessive force claim
under the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
he failed to state a claim. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force
against those convicted of a crime. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10
(1989). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial
detainees, those charged with, but not yet convicted of, a crime, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 523 (1979), from the use of excessive force. See Brown v. Borough of
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Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990). James alleged the use of excessive
force during the course of his arrest, before he was charged with, or convicted of, a
crime. Therefore, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protections against the use of
excessive force were inapplicable.3 Also, James failed to state a Sixth Amendment claim
for denial of counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the
initiation of formal judicial proceedings. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398
(1977). James based his denial of counsel claim on allegations that he was not permitted
to call his lawyer or otherwise speak to counsel while he was being interrogated, which
was before he was charged. (Complaint/Amended Complaint at Legal Claim 3.4 )
In its order of November 23, 2003, the District Court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the York County prison because James admitted that he brought no
claims against the prison. (Objections to Report & Recommendation dated March 23,
2003, at 16-17.) The District Court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Baylark on the ground that James did not exhaust his administrative remedies through the
prison grievance system. Prisoners must exhaust all available administrative remedies
3

Additionally, the “generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’” under the
Fourteenth Amendment, was not the guide for analyzing his claim because James could
seek relief under a more explicit textual source of protection, the Fourth Amendment.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842
(1998).
4

James’ complaint and amended complaint differ only in that his amended complaint
was filed against three additional defendants. A document (doc. 22) that fleshes out his
specific claims against the three additional defendants was treated as a supplement to his
complaint.
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before bringing a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 about prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2004). Defendant Baylark

showed, and James did not dispute, that James did not seek an administrative remedy.
James argued, however, that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies
because the exhaustion requirement did not apply to the type of suit he brought against
Baylark. This argument is without merit because the exhaustion requirement applies to
“all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
James also claimed that the administrative remedy was not available to him
because he was not given a copy of the prison handbook, which describes the grievance
procedures, or otherwise made aware of the prison procedures. Baylark admitted that
James did not receive a handbook until a month after the incident in question, but
claimed that James was apprised of the procedures for filing a grievance upon admission
into the prison. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
the District Court concluded that James could not have filed a grievance because he was
unaware of the grievance procedure when Baylark denied him use of the telephone. The
District Court nonetheless granted summary judgment on the basis that James did not file
a grievance even after he received a handbook one month later. James, however, claimed
that he never received a handbook, and only later learned of the grievance procedure
while researching his criminal case in the prison law library. Nonetheless, the result in
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the District Court was correct. James should have filed a grievance when he discovered
the administrative process. Although the prison could have rejected James’ later-filed
grievance as untimely, had it done so, the District Court could have evaluated whether
James’ resulting procedural default was excused because the application of the ordinary
deadline for filing a grievance offended the Federal Constitution or the policy behind
§ 1997e(a). See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 232. Because James never filed a grievance, he
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and the District Court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Baylark.
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Defendants Morgan, Westmoreland, Peddicord, Craul, Glowczewski, Kessler, and Fells,
in its order of May 6, 2005. Although James argued that Craul and Morgan gave “false”
testimony to influence the bond decision, and otherwise played a significant role, with
Peddicord, in setting the bond amount, the District Court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of those Defendants on the Eighth Amendment excessive bond claim.
First, in Pennsylvania, the district justice, not the police officers, set bail. See Pa. R.
Crim. P. 120. Although authority to set bail is not a determinative factor, see
Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 211 (1st Cir. 1987), police involvement in the bail
decision did not “manipulate” or “help to shape” or “exercise significant influence over”
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the bond decision.5 See id. at 211-12. Furthermore, no Defendant was involved in the
hearing on James’ motion to reduce bail in the Court of Common Pleas. James submitted
the transcript, which sets forth the attorneys’ arguments on whether James was a flight
risk and the trial court’s decision that the amount of bail was necessary. (Appendix to
Objections to Report & Recommendation, Ex. 3.) Moreover, as the District Court
concluded, in light of the state court’s decision to deny a bail reduction, principles of
federalism, comity, and judicial economy precluded review.
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment on the Fifth
Amendment claims based on police interrogation without the benefit of Miranda
warnings and the denial of his right to counsel. The Fifth Amendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003)
(plurality). Therefore, James cannot bring a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely
for being questioned before being provided with Miranda warnings. See id. at 766-70;
Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 552 (3d Cir. 2003). Likewise, he has no free-standing
Fifth Amendment claim for denial of counsel during his interrogation. See Giuffre v.
Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994). Furthermore, to the extent that James’ Fifth
Amendment claims were based on assertions of compelled self-incrimination, Heck bars

5

Even by James’ description, the “false” testimony of which he complains is Craul and
Morgan’s testimony about the crime for which he has since been convicted. To the extent
that success on his excessive bond claim against Craul and Morgan would imply the
invalidity of his conviction, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), bars his claim.
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their review. See 512 U.S. at 487. His statements were used against him in his trial.
(Appendix to Objections to Report & Recommendation, Ex. 4.) Questioning the
evidence used in James’ prosecution would put the validity of his still-valid conviction at
issue. Furthermore, the state trial court already reviewed and rejected James’ Fifth
Amendment claims in ruling on a motion to suppress. (Appendix to Objections to
Report & Recommendation, Ex. 5.)
The District Court’s grant of summary judgment on James’ Fourth Amendment
claims for unlawful search and seizure was proper, too. James argued that his rental
mailbox was unlawfully searched and that he was unlawfully seized. However, he
conceded that his arrest and conviction were based on the evidence gathered from the
mailbox rental company and its facilities. (James’ Brief in Support of Motion to Compel
Discovery (doc. 120) at 5; Appendix to Objections to Report & Recommendation, Ex. 5.)
Therefore, his Fourth Amendment claims were a thinly-veiled collateral attack on his
conviction. Accordingly, review of his Fourth Amendment claims is barred by Heck.
See 512 U.S. at 487. Moreover, the state court previously rejected James’ claims of
unlawful search and seizure when it denied his suppression motion. (Appendix to
Objections to Report & Recommendation, Ex. 1 & 5.)
The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on the Fourth
Amendment claims of excessive force on the basis of qualified immunity, either.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar
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as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). The inquiry into the applicability of qualified immunity is twofold: (1) whether
the plaintiff alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right
was established at the time of the alleged deprivation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201 (2001).
Whether James alleged a deprivation of his right to be free from excessive force in
the course of his arrest turns on whether he showed that a seizure occurred and that it was
unreasonable. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004). It is undisputed
that James’ arrest was a seizure, so the question becomes whether the force used in the
arrest was unreasonable. Defendants contend that James did not allege the use of
unreasonable force. Reasonableness is judged on the totality of the circumstances,
including the seriousness of the crime, the safety threat posed by the suspect, the
suspect’s attempts to resist arrest or to evade it by flight. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396;
Kopec, 361 F.3d at 776 -77. Upon review of these factors, it is clear that the force used
by Defendants Craul, Kessler, Fells, Peddicord, Westmoreland, and Morgan cannot be
considered unreasonable. James alleged that after he threw down his package and moved
away from police officers, he was thrown to the ground, roughly stepped on, and
handcuffed by officers in the course of his arrest. As the District Court concluded, it was
objectively reasonable for the officers to use a modest amount of force for a brief period
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of time (until James was placed in a police van), to prevent James’ escape.
The District Court also properly held that Defendant Glowczewski did not use an
unreasonable amount of force, despite hitting James with the side of a van. The parties
dispute whether the van was moving at the time of impact, but, for our purposes, we
assume, as James testified at his deposition, that the van was moving at a nominal speed.
(Supplement to Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 1.)
Although James claimed physical injuries, he was able to stand up immediately after he
was hit. (Id.) Under the circumstances, Glowczewski, in slowly moving the van to block
James’ escape, did not use unreasonable force. Cf. Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822
(3d Cir. 1997).
In its order of May 6, 2005, the District Court also granted the motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Randy Sipes, the California
narcotics officer involved in this case. James did not dispute that Sipes’ only contacts
with Pennsylvania were calling the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office by
telephone, shipping a package to that office, and testifying against James at a preliminary
hearing. (Declaration of Randy Sipes.) The District Court held that such contacts were
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the “effects” test of Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984), because the tort of which James complained (the unlawful
search of his mailbox and the seizure of his person) had been held lawful by the
Pennsylvania courts. We disagree, but we will affirm on other grounds.
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The District Court had personal jurisdiction over Sipes because Sipes’ allegedly
tortious acts were intended to have an impact on James in Pennsylvania. Defendants can
“‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court’” in the forum toward which they direct
intentional and allegedly tortious conduct. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90. See also IMO
Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 256 (3d Cir .1998). Nonetheless, although James
alleged conduct that met the “effects test” set forth in Calder, the Pennsylvania courts
have ruled on the legality of the search and seizure, as the District Court noted. In fact,
as explained above, James’ arrest and conviction were based on the evidence gathered
from that search and seizure that the state courts ratified. (James’ Brief in Support of
Motion to Compel Discovery (doc. 120) at 5; Appendix to Objections to Report &
Recommendation, Ex. 5.) Therefore, success on the claim against Sipes would imply the
invalidity of James’ conviction. Accordingly, James’ Fourth Amendment claim against
Sipes is barred by Heck. See 512 U.S. at 487. We will affirm on this alternative basis
supported by the record. See Erie Telecomms. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir.
1988).
In its order of May 6, 2005, the District Court additionally dismissed any
remaining claims against York County Police Department pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
for failure to state a claim. Although the complaint, amended complaint, and supplement
to the complaint do not include claims of a custom or policy to use excessive force or to
deny Miranda warnings, the District Court addressed the policy claims that James put

14

forth in his Objections to a previous Report & Recommendation. (“Plaintiff Objection to
Magistrate Proposed Findings For Report & Recommendation,” filed March 26, 2003.)
Specifically, James claimed that his treatment demonstrated that the Police Department
had a policy of using excessive force and denying Miranda warnings. (Id.) The District
Court held that success on James’ policy claims was impossible because James had failed
to show the constitutional violations on which his policy claims were based. Although at
first blush, the District Court appears to go outside the pleadings to resolve the claims
against the Police Department, the District Court only indirectly relies on other
Defendants’ submissions in support of summary judgment in their favor. The District
Court more directly relies on law of the case, see Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,
618 (1983), to dismiss the policy claims for failure to state a claim. Therefore, the order
dismissing the claims against the York County Police Department was proper. As the
District Court also correctly concluded, it would be futile for James to amend his
complaint.
After the District Court dismissed the claims against the York County Police
Department and determined amendment was futile, no other claims remained. Therefore,
the District Court did not err in denying, as moot, James’ additional motion for
appointment of counsel and for discovery, as well as his motion to amend the complaint.
The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in previously granting
Defendants’ motion to depose James and denying James a protective order from the
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proposed deposition pending the resolution of one of his motions for appointment of
counsel. Defendants filed a motion to depose James because he was in prison. James,
seeking to defer his deposition until after counsel was appointed, moved for a protective
order. The District Court, having declined to appoint counsel, did not abuse its
discretion when it denied James’ motion and granted Defendants’ motion. Likewise, in
the order identified as the order of February 20, 2002, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying James’ motion to compel and granting Defendants’ motion for a
protective order, both without prejudice to refiling after the District Court considered a
pending motion to dismiss James’ complaint.
Furthermore, the District Court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying
James’ motions for appointment of counsel. The District Court identified the appropriate
considerations and did not err in concluding that it was not necessary to appoint counsel.
See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-58.
In sum, because our review of the pertinent orders entered by the District Court
reveals no substantial issue on appeal, we will summarily affirm. James’ motion for
appointment of counsel is denied.
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